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FOREWORD: 
THE POWER OF PRESUMPTIONS 
RANDY E. BARNE'IT* 
Once you start to notice it, you see it everywhere. Burden-
shifting is pervasive. I suppose I began to notice the power of 
presumptions when examining how to protect the rights "re-
tained by the people" referred to in the Ninth Amendment1 with-
out having to enumerate each one. I proposed the creation of a 
"presumption of liberty" that would extend the same protective 
presumption now accorded freedom of speech to all other right-
ful exercises of liberty. This presumption would shift the burden 
to the government to justify as necessary and proper any restric-
tion on the rightful exercise of any liberty. 2 
This idea had been stimulated by my reconsideration of the 
constitutional theory embodied in Justice Stone's opinion in 
United States v. Carolene Products.3 Although footnote 4 is commit-
ted to memory by most professors of constitutional law, less well-
discussed today is the passage of the text it qualifies: 
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is 
to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary 
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitu-
tional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally 
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption 
that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge 
and experience of the legislators.4 
Footnote 4 then informs us that: 
There may be a narrower scope for operation of this presump-
tion of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be 
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those 
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. 
1. See U.S. CoNST., amend. IX ("The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). 
2. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: Implementing the Ninth Amendment, in 2 THE 
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 1 
(Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993); Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: james Madison's Ninth Amend-
ment, in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH 
AMENDMENT 1 (Randy. E. Barnett ed., 1989). 
3. 304 U.S. 144 (1937). This reconsideration had itself been stimulated by J.M. Balkin, 
The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 279 (1989). 
4. Id. at 152 (emphasis added). Even less well-discussed is the fact that the legislation at 
issue in the case was a classic example of economic protectionism, in this case, of the dairy 
industry. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 397. 
614 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 17 
of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equal2' spe-
cific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. 
In this way, the Court presumes that the Constitution grants near 
plenary powers to Congress, unless that presumption is rebutted 
in a way that meets the standards set by Footnote 4. Thus did the 
power of presumptions effect a constitutional "revolution."6 
Though it was famously qualified by him, this shift of presump-
tions did not originate with Justice Stone. The seeds of this con-
stitutional revolution were sown by Justice Brandeis in O'Gorman 
and Young v. Hartford Insurance Co. 7 The significance of this case, 
and the means that Brandeis employed to achieve his purposes, 
did not go unnoticed or unheralded at the time. It is worth quot-
ing at length from the pages of the Columbia Law Review the gush-
ing comments penned by Walton Hamilton, an admiring Yale 
Law School professor: 
[T]he simple lines of [this] short opinion present a superb ex-
ample of the jurist's art The catalogue of precedents is left to 
the dissent; the technique of distinction would do no more 
than serve the current need. There is no attempt to make out 
a case; an elaborate argument, concerned with the insurance 
business, filled with citations, and buttressed in footnotes 
would save a single statute. The demand is to find an escape 
from the recent holdings predicated upon "freedom of con-
tract" as "the rule," from which a departure is to be allowed 
only in exceptional cases; The occasion calls not for deft use of 
tactics, but for a larger strategy. The device of presumption is 
almost as old as law; Brandeis revives the presumption that 
acts of a state legislature are valid and applies it to statutes 
regulating business activity. The factual brief has many times 
been employed to make a case for social legislation; Brandeis 
5. /d. at 152 n.4 (emphasis added). Of course, the presumption is also said to have a 
narrower scope when legislation "restricts •.• [the] political processes" or involves "preju· 
dice against discrete and insular minorities." /d. 
6. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FouNDATIONS 40 (1991) (contending 
that the "constitutional triumph of the activist welfare state" in 1937 was a genuine consti· 
tutional revolution). 
7. 282 U.S. 251 (1931). This strategy for limiting the scope of judicial review was not 
his, however. It was proposed in 1893 by Harvard Law Professor James B. Thayer. 
This rule recognizes that, having regard to the great, complex, ever-unfolding 
exigencies of government, much will seem unconstitutional to one man, or body 
of men, may reasonably not seem so to another; that the constitution often ad· 
mits of different interpretations; that there is often a range of choice and judg· 
ment; that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon the legislature 
any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range of choice; and whatever 
choice is rational is constitutional. 
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. 
L. REv. 129, 144 (1893). 
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demands of the opponents of legislative acts a recitation of fact show-
ing that the evil did not exist or that the remedy was inappropriate. 
He appeals from precedents to more venerable precedents, 
reverses the rules of presumption and proof in cases involving 
the control of industry; and sets up a realistic test of constitu-
tionality. It is all done with such verisimilitude that a discus-
sion of particular cases is unnecessary; it all seems obvious-
once Brandeis has shown how the trick is done. It is attended 
with so little of a fanfare of judicial trumpets that it might have 
passed almost unnoticed, save for the dissenters, who usurp 
the office of the chorus in a Greek tragedy and comment 
upon the action. Yet an argument which degrades "freedom of 
contract" to a constitutional doctrine of the second magnitude 
is compressed into a single compelling paragraph.8 
615 
Professor Hamilton also noticed the peculiar power of presump-
tions when he observed that: 
Brandeis has, to serve judicial necessity, remade an old device. 
His presumption, rebuttable only by a recitation of fact, is a 
compound of the older presumption of constitutionality and 
Holmes' formula "It is not unconstitutional." The use of the 
double negative may logically add nothing; but it has a high rhetorical 
value, and has come to furnish a basis for an ingenious proce-
dural device. 9 
In his paean, however, Hamilton appears to have missed the 
irony of the originator of the "Brandeis Brief" -the innovation 
heralded as compelling the Supreme Court to come out of its 
"formalist" shell and confront the hard facts of the real world10-
having adopted a presumption that made his "Legal Realist" em-
pirical inquiry obsolete. Never again would a defender of so-
called "economic" legislation have to present facts and evidence 
8. Walton H. Hamilton, The jurist's Art, 31 CoLUM. L. REv. 1073, 1074-75 (19S1)(cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis added). 
9. Jd. at 1074 n. 8 (emphasis added). 
10. See John W.Johnson, Brandeis Brief, in THE OXFORD CoMPANION TO THE SuPREME 
CoURT OF THE UNITED STATES 85 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992): 
Louis D. Brandeis, then a well-known attorney and social activist, submitted a 
lengthy brief supporting the constitutionality of an Oregon statute that limited 
the hours per day that women could work in laundries and other industries .... 
The MuUer brief devoted a mere two pages to discussion of legal issues; the 
remaining 110 pages presented evidence of the deleterious effects oflong hours 
of labor on the "health, safety, morals and general welfare of women." .••. 
The MuUer briefs analysis was consonant with the fact-oriented "sociological 
jurisprudence" of the Progressive era. It forced the Court to consider data that 
state legislatures employed in drafting reform laws. 
I find it necessary to include this quotation because most law students I have asked who 
have taken constitutional law are unfamiliar with the tale. Perhaps the story is not 
trumpeted today because the merits of this admirably realist device are so incongruous 
with the unrealistic, but widely accepted, presumption of constitutionality. 
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(unless the qualifications of Footnote 4 are implicated). Such 
facts would . simply be presumed-well-nigh irrebuttably-
whether or not they were true. Indeed, such "facts" would even 
be made up by the Court itself.11 So much for realism.l2 
Once I began to think seriously about the power of presump-
tions in constitutional theory, it began to affect my thinking 
about contract law as well. Contract scholars had long character-
ized as assent-based only those terms that were expressly assented 
to, or those to which assent could be implied-in-fact. In contrast, 
implied-in-law terms were thought to be imposed upon the parties 
by the legal system. Contract scholars associated with Legal Real-
ism had emphasized the inevitable incompleteness of expressed 
or implied-in-fact contract terms based on consent, and therefore 
the pervasiveness of terms that were implied-in-law for reasons 
either of principle or of policy. Thus was it claimed that consent 
was marginal to contract law, since contract law only applied 
when there was a "gap" in ass.ent. How that gap should be filled 
was therefore a matter of policy and certainly not, except wholly 
fictitiously, a matter of the parties' consent. In sum, the law of 
contract had little, if anything, to do with contractual consent 
because contract law operated precisely when consent gave out-
and this happened all the time. 
The flaw in this picture was revealed by the metaphor of "de-
fault rules," a concept recently imported by Law and Economics 
scholars from corporate law theory into contract theory.13 The 
default rule metaphor revealed that, except in rare .circum-
stances, the law of contract applied only presumptively, and could 
be "rebutted" by the manifested assent of the parties. This com-
11. See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 
S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (1993): 
[T] hose attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden 
"to negative every conceivable basis which might support it," •••. Moreover, 
because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a 
statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived 
reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature •.•• In 
other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may 
be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. 
Justice Stevens took issue with this standard: "In my view, this formulation sweeps too 
broadly, for it is difficult to imagine a legislative classification that could not be supported 
by a 'reasonably conceivable state of facts.' Judicial review under the 'conceivable set of 
facts' test is tantamount to no review at all." /d. at 2106 (Stevens]., concurring). 
12. Is it too cynical to suggest that the philosophy of Legal Realism is dispensable when 
one has the votes? Or would this be the epitome of realism? 
13. See, e.g., Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDJSCIPLI· 
NARY L. REv. 1-444 (1993). 
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pletely reversed the image that had been widely accepted, until 
recently, that contract law was imposed on contracting parties. 
For it turned out that contact law was only "imposed" on those 
parties who chose to accept it by remaining silent.14 In this way, 
when parties who are rationally informed about the background 
default rules of contract law choose to remain silent on a matter 
governed by the default rules provided by contract law, we may 
conclude that they have consented to the use of these rules 
should a dispute arise. 
In addition, when contracting parties are not rationally in-
formed about the background default_ rules of contract law, their 
silence may still be meaningful enough to influence the selection 
of default rules adopted by a legal system. Lon Fuller had long 
ago observed that even when persons are not "conscious" of a 
particular fact, they pervasively make what he called "tacit as-
sumptions" about these facts: 
Words like "intention," "assumption," "expectation" and "un-
derstanding" all seem to imply a conscious state involving an 
awareness of alternatives and a deliberate choice among them. 
It is, however, plain that there is a psychological state which 
can be described as a "tacit assumption" that does not involve 
a consciousness of alternatives. The absent-minded professor 
stepping from his office into the hall as he reads a book "as-
sumes" that the floor of the hall will be there to receive him. 
His conduct is conditioned and directed by this assumption, 
even though the possibility that the floor has been removed 
does not "occur" to him, that is, is not present in his mental 
processes. 15 
Another term for a tacit assumption is a presumption. We all pre-
sume a great deal about the world-far more than we could ever 
articulate, even to ourselves. The fact that these presumptions 
are not always present in our "consciousness" does not make 
them any less real.16 Nor does it make our manifestations of as-
sent any less conditional on their turning out to be accurate. 
Consciousness itself is a bit more complicated than those con-
14. The analysis presented here is explained at greater length in Randy E. Barnett, The 
Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821 (1992). 
15. LoN L. FuLLER, BASIC CoNTRAcr LAw 666-67 (1947). 
16. See PaulJ. Heald &James E. Heald, Mindlessness and the Law, 77 VA. L. REv. 1127, 
1137 (1991) ("Decisionmaking proceeds from both conscious and nonconscious states of 
awareness."). 
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tract scholars who limited the notion of contractual consent to 
conscious assent appear to have assumed.17 
Moreover, once this is recognized, if contractual consent is to 
be facilitated, the substance of contract law should be deter-
mined with at least one eye on those circumstances that would 
prevent parties from "contracting around" those rules of contract 
law with which they might disagree. So, for example, if it would 
be rational for one-shot players in a small transaction to remain 
ignorant about the background default rules of contract law, 
then contract law perhaps should reflect what most such parties 
would have wanted, in an effort to discern what these parties did 
implicitly want.18 And should rationally ignorant one-shot players 
do business with rationally informed repeat players, the default 
rules of contract should be chosen to reflect the likely tacit as-
sumptions of the rationally ignorant. In this way, the rationally 
informed would be induced to reveal to the other party when 
they might wish to deviate from the tacit understanding of the 
other party, thus informing the rationally ignorant by their bar-
gaining behavior that they wished to play by counter-intuitive 
rules.19 By this process, the manifested assent of both parties 
would be brought into closer correspondence to their actual 
assent. 
In sum, parties who are rationally informed about the back-
ground rules of contract can be said to have consented to any 
default rule regardless of its content. However, given that many 
persons are rationally ignorant, the default rules of contract law 
should be chosen to reflect the conventional tacit assumptions of 
rationally ignorant parties. In this way, when two rationally igno-
rant parties are contracting with one another, such "convention-
alist" default rules are likely to represent their actual intentions; 
and when a rationally ignorant party is contracting with a ration-
ally informed party, such conventionalist default rules will induce 
the rationally informed party to reveal by its bargaining behavior 
that it wishes to deviate from the norm and thereby educate the 
rationally ignorant party of this fact. In either event, the objective 
manifestation of assent is brought into closer alignment with the 
subjective assent of the parties.20 
17. See DANIEL C. DENNETr, CoNSCIOUSNESS ExPLAINED (1991). 
18. See Barnett, supra note 14, at 88().83. 
19. /d. at 886-92. 
20. I have defended and elaborated this view in •.• and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. 
INTERDISCIPUNARY L. REv. 421 (1993). 
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Thus was the traditional Legal Realist image of contract law 
reversed by the concept of presumptions. The law of contract was 
ordinarily not simply to be imposed on the parties by the legal 
system for reasons of principle or policy wholly unrelated to the 
parties' consent, as.generations of realist and post-realist contract 
scholars had maintained. Instead, the default rules of contract 
law operate presumptively. Contractual consent is served rather 
than displaced when default rules are formulated either to re-
flect the tacit assumptions of most contracting parties, or to in-
duce bargaining behavior that serves better to inform the parties 
about the rules by which their relationship will be governed. 
Having observed the power of presumptions in both the public 
and private law spheres, the publication of Richard Gaskins's new 
book, Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse, 21 seemed to me unusu-
ally timely. In it he documents the use of presumptions in polit-
ical and legal discourse, including constitutional law: 
Although the authority of federal courts to review legislative 
and executive actions was effectively asserted early in the nine-
teenth century, bitter struggles have continued into the pres-
ent day on whether federal and state legislation enjoys a 
presumption of constitutionality. After decades of intricate manip-
ulation, this phrase has become virtually meaningless, but the 
underlying concept figures heavily in contemporary debate 
over judicial activism. Under Chief Justice Warren in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the United States Supreme Court to inject more 
authority and flexibility into judicial review, while trying to 
maintain the Court's traditional image as an impartial tribu-
nal. Much of that flexibili!Y came from adjusting the presump-
tion of constitutionality.22 . 
Gaskins maintains that this phenomenon is pervasive. 
Legislatures and administrative bodies build presumptions 
into legal standards as way of structuring the inevitable uncer-
tainties of implementation .... By allocating in advance cer-
tain procedural and evidentiary burdens among relevant 
interest groups, legislation favors substantive outcomes that 
defy the bland and balanced rhetoric one finds in many 
statutes .... 
Controversies about proof and metaphors of sensory verifi-
cation occur at all levels of the judicial hierarchy, frequently 
masking deeper conflicts over public values. Appeals courts 
derive conclusions of law from the fact that no evidence in 
21. RicHARD H. GASKINs, BuRDENs OF PROOF IN MooERN DiscoURSE (1992). 
22. !d. at 21-22. 
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contradiction was introduced at trial, or at least insufficient 
evidence. In most such cases, the nature and salience of evi-
dence are more important than sheer quantity. To close the 
gap between quantity and quality of evidence, a structure of 
presumptions must cut through complex social ambiguities. 
For example, the defendant in a discrimination suit may have 
to prove an absence of subjective bias. The opponent of por-
nography may be forced to demonstrate a causal connection 
between the printed page and social behavior. 
The rationale for judicial decisions in such cases can be 
stated in terms of evidence, but the underlying issue is about 
presumptions: what conclusions can be drawn from contro-
versial or indeterminate evidence-that is, from ignorance in 
its many guises? When exactly is evidence good enough to 
meet the implicit burdens lurking in legal rules? In short, 
where is the dividing line between proof and ignorance, and 
what follows from inconclusive data? The institutionalized 
procedures of law force us to confront these questions rather 
than treating them as painlessly settled by nature or custom.23 
And the same phenomenon is pervasive in legal scholarship as 
well. 
Participants in this Symposium address different implications 
of the pervasive reliance on presumptions that Gaskins describes. 
Ronald Allen and Dale Nance approach these issues as evidence 
scholars. As Ron Allen explains,24 evidence scholars, more than 
any other group, have attempted to analyze the concept of pre-
sumptions and the appropriate allocation of burdens of proof. 
He contends that "[e]ver since evidence emerged as a discipline, 
its very point has been to administer the problems that result 
from the interaction of data with the background and experi-
ence of the decision maker. "25 In his article, Allen provides a 
useful bibliography of evidence scholarship on this issue. He 
then summarizes the fruits of this research and faults Gaskins for 
not adequately taking this body of learning into account. Allen 
identifies the different functions performed by presumptions 
and burdens of proof, and how these functions have influenced 
the particular allocation of such burdens in different contexts. 
He notes that "the problem can be just as much complexity as 
ignorance. The concern is not just with some limited data set, 
but with the virtually infinite data sets represented by the human 
23. I d. at 22-23 (citations omitted). 
24. Ronald]. Allen, Burdens of Proof, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modem LegalDi.scourse, 
17 HAR.v.J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 627 (1994). 
25. Id. at 640. 
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decisionmakers .... "26 Allen's contribution is a wonderfully con-
cise introduction to the complexities of evidence scholarship that 
bears on the issue of presumptions, arguments from ignorance, 
and burdens of proof. 
Dale Nance moves the discussion in another, intriguing direc-
tion.27 Ronald Dworkin long ago argued that all of law is not 
reducible only to "rules," but that it consists also of "principles."28 
In many doctrinal fields today, however, the challenge would be 
to sort through the principles to find any rules at all. Still, per-
haps because it is developed by judges and lawyers to govern 
their own conduct, rather than that of ordinary c~tizens, evidence 
law remains a bastion of legal rules. As part of his project of 
identifying the mcyor principles lurking beneath these rules, 29 
Nance identifies, explains, and normatively defends what he calls 
the "principle of civility": 
One ought to presume, until sufficient evidence is adduced to 
show otherwise, that any given person has acted in accordance 
with serious social obligations. As a corollary, how much evi-
dence is "sufficient" depends upon the nature and severity of 
the alleged breach, as well as the nature and severity of the 
contemplated consequences of a determination of breach. 30 
He contends that this principle is superior to competing theories 
of evidence, such as those based solely on empirical accuracy or 
on statistical probability, in explaining how the law allocates bur-
dens of proof. To establish this claim, he applies his analysis to 
both the criminal and civil law contexts. Moreover, Nance argues 
that the adoption of such a principle is at the heart of a liberal or 
pluralist community.31 And, like the phenomena of presump-
tions, once this principle is identified, one notices its application 
everywhere. 
Whereas Dale Nance's article is at the intersection of evidence 
law and more normative analysis, the contributions by Lawrence 
Solum, Mark Rosen, and Gregory Klass and Gustavo Faigenbaum 
rest squarely in the arena of deontological moral theory. In par-
26. Id. at 641. 
27. Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 647 
(1994). 
28. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1966). 
29. See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IowA L. REv. 227 (1988). 
30. Nance, supra note 27, at 648. 
31. See Nance, supra note 27, at 653 ("[T]o presume that someone has breached his or 
her duty fails to accord that person the dignity associated with the status of membership in 
the community that is governed by the norms whose breach is at issue."). 
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ticular, they each examine whether the use of presumptions or 
arguments from ignorance either commits one to a transcenden-
tal realm of values or permits one to avoid recourse to such a 
realm. 
Lawrence Solum applies rational choice or decision theory to 
reveal how burdens of proof assist decisionmaking confronted by 
two distinct problems of uncertainty: risk and ignorance. 32 The 
problem of risk concerns the ability to make rational decisions 
when probabilities can be assigned to various outcomes of our 
decisions. In contrast, the problem of uncertainty is the problem 
of making rational decisions in the face of ignorance or an ab-
sence of information-even about the probabilities of outcomes. 
According to Solum, when dealing with the problem of risk, ra-
tional choice theory suggests that burdens of proof should be 
chosen to minimize the chances of an erroneous decision. When 
burdens of proof are used to deal with uncertainty, however, our 
ignorance of the probability of error prevents such a strategy. 33 
Drawing upon his previous scholarship concerning the destruc-
tion of evidence,34 Solum suggests that under conditions of igno-
rance, burdens of proof should be allocated to facilitate some 
end, such as deterrence or fairness.35 Solum also contests Gas-
kins' claim that when assigning burdens of proof to deal with 
uncertainty, we are necessarily making a transcendental truth-
claim. He argues that neither the presumptions adopted to deal 
with risk nor those intended to deal with ignorance need make 
such claims.36 Solum concludes by denying Gaskins's contention 
that using constructs, such as Dworkin's metaphor of Hercules37 
or John Rawls' "original position," entail a commitment to dis-
covering transcendent truths.38 
Mark Rosen examines the issue of whether the judicial alloca-
tions of burdens of proof can be justified on the grounds that 
such allocations reflect a transcendent truth. While accepting 
Gaskins's thesis that when judges allocate burdens of proof they 
implicitly claim for their decisions the status of transcendent 
32. Lawrence B. Solum, You Prove It! Why Should !?, 17 HARv. J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 691 
(1994). 
33. !d. at 697. 
34. JAMIE S. GoREUCK, STEPHEN j. MARzEN & LAWRENCE B. SoLUM, DESTRUCTION oF 
EVIDENCE (1985). 
35. Id. at 699. 
36. Id. at 671. 
37. Id. at 702-704. 
38. !d. at 704-706. 
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truth, Rosen questions the institutional competence of the judici-
ary to make such a claim.39 Rosen contends thatjudicial resolu-
tions of social disputes are "reified" as transcendental truths for 
two reasons. First, viewing judicial decisions as morally right legit-
imates the use of governmental power. Second, it seems to avoid 
the positivist problem of obeying whatever laws may happen to 
be enacted. Nonetheless, Rosen argues that "courts should be 
divested of their generally-perceived authority to identify tran-
scendental truth."4° Contending that "the project of coexistence 
is the most that can be collectively pursued at the national level 
in a noncoercive pluralistic State, "41 he argues that judicial deci-
sions should be viewed as containing an implicit disclaimer: 
The justification for allowing/proscribing the activity in ques-
tion is merely that this outcome is consistent with society's 
consensus that a diverse citizenry should coexist without un-
due coercion. This is a practical resolution that makes no 
claims to clarify disputed transcendental issues.42 
Ending the section on the relationship between the allocation 
of burdens of proof and the issue of transcendence is the contri-
bution by Gregory Klass and Gustavo Faigenbaum.43 They ex-
amine critically and attempt to elaborate upon the Hegelian 
analysis of the problem of arguing from ignorance that is offered 
by Richard Gaskins in his book.44 
The Symposium concludes with two papers that seek to use the 
concept of presumptions to illuminate different bodies of sub-
stantive law. Tamar Frankel attempts to explain how presump-
tions are used in corporate law to achieve the difficult balance 
between stability and change.45 She identifies and then applies 
four categories of presumptions that are used for this purpose: 
(i) experience-based presumptions, for example, the pre-
sumption that in financial matters, most people will act in 
their own self-interest rather than in the interest of others; (ii) 
tradition-based presumptions, for example, that people will 
follow the trodden path, which undergirds the rule that direc-
39. Mark D. Rosen, Difrocking the Courts: Resolving "Cases or Controversies," Not Announc-
ing Transcendental Truths, 17 HARv.J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 715 (1994). 
40. Jd. at 729. 
41. Jd. at 727. 
42. Jd. at 729-30. 
43. Gregory M. Klass & Gustavo Faigenbaum, The Enlightenment of Dialectics: Strategies 
Involved in Burdens of Proof, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 735 (1994). 
44. See GASKINS, supra note 21, at 240-272. 
45. Tamar Frankel, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof as Tools for Legal Stability and 
Change, 17 HARv.J.L. & Pua. PoL'Y 759 (1994). 
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tors must properly inform themselves and deliberate before 
making decisions; (iii) presumptions of legality, legitimacy, 
and orderliness, for example, that corporate directors were le-
gally elected, and that fiduciaries hold and manage other peo-
ple's money in accordance with the law; and (iv) initial 
presumptions in favor of defendants.46 
Richard Gaskins, whose book provoked this Symposium, closes it 
by applying his analysis of presumptions to the legislation creat-
ing administrative agencies charged with dealing with problems 
of children and of families.47 He argues that when such statutes 
are viewed as creating multiple competing default rules-as op-
posed to rules simpliciter-to govern inevitably complex 
problems, they are not as contradictory as to some they may 
seem. 
Au Revoir to the I.H.S. Annual Symposium on Law and 
Philosophy 
For the past ten years it has been both my responsibility and 
my pleasure to serve as the intermediary between three outstand-
ing institutions: the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy at 
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course, that one day our funding would elapse. And now it has. 
Thus it is time for me to thank one final time the Institute for 
Humane Studies, the trustees of the Veritas Fund, and the editors of 
the Journal. In particular I wish to express my appreciation to Ja-
son Levine, this year's Editor-in-Chief. I have had the good for-
tune to deal with nine incredibly bright and capable Editors-in-
Chief, and Jason has been among the very best of an impressive 
group. Finally, I want to thank my old friend Walter Grinder of 
the Institute. It was Walter's initiative and encouragement that got 
this project off the ground so many years ago, and whatever suc-
cess we have achieved was made possible by his patient and far-
sighted guidance. 
We have had a good run. 
